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The New Jersey Radium Dial Workers
and the Dynamics of Occupational Disease




Between 1917 and 1923 over 800 women worked for the United States
Radium Corporation ("USRC") in Orange, New Jersey handpainting wrist-watch
faces with a substance made luminescent by radioactive materials. While these
workers were exposed to injurious, even mortal, levels of radiation, less than a
dozen received any compensation for their injuries. The injured workers' failure
to receive compensation for their work-related injuries can be explained only in
part by the shrewd legal maneuvers of their employer and its legal team. Just as
importantly, a complex of medical, legal, and sociological factors hampered the
clear identification of the victims' malady and undermined the use of the legal
system as a remedy. The symptoms of radiation poisoning, then a relatively
unknown and ill defined occupational disease, were indistinct, inconsistent, and
characterized by long latency periods. These features compounded the workers'
legal problems once they entered the formal legal system by dramatically
complicating attempts to prove causation, by raising the specter of the statute of
limitations defense, and by playing a major role in the settlement negotiation
process. As a consequence, even when some women did resort to the formal
legal system for relief, they faced hurdles endemic to the legal process and a
dynamic of litigation that favored and rewarded repeat-player defendants.
The New Jersey radium dial-painter episode is one of the most well-known
subjects in the history of occupational disease.' However, few of the writings
* Associate Professor, School of Medicine, East Carolina University, Greenville,
North Carolina. Ph.D. (History), Rice University, J.D., University of Texas School of
Law.
**Assistant Professor, South Texas College of Law, Houston, Texas. J.D.,
University of Houston Law Center; Ph.D. (History) University of Houston.
The authors thank Kermit Hall and Robert C. Palmer for comments on earlier drafts
of this essay.
1. Some excellent and important treatments include Daniel Lang, A Most Valuable
Accident, NEw YORKER, MAY 2, 1959, at 49; F.G. Gosling, Argonne National
Laboratory's Radium Dial Worker Project, Paper delivered at Organization of American
Historians, Washington, D.C., March 22, 1990; Anthony Bale, Compensation Crisis:
The Value and Meaning of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses in the United States,
1842-1932, at 636-47 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University);
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on the subject have analyzed the attorneys' files and the legal proceedings with
the specific goal of unraveling how the process and strategy were influenced by
the sociological and medical features of the incident.2 As one of the earliest
documented attempts to gain remuneration for an occupational illness, the
radium dial-painter saga stands as an historical cameo, presaging central
recurring themes in occupational health litigation through the twentieth century.
Despite unceasing change in both law and culture over the last half century,
many of the forces that shaped the dial-painter episode continue to surface in
other occupational health contexts3 and underscore some of the reasons why the
legal system remains challenged in its attempts to provide effective and fair
compensation for occupational diseases.
This article examines the radium dial-painter episode in four main sections.
The first section presents a basic, historical narrative of the dial-painter litigation.
The second section identifies and explores the medical, legal, and sociological
reasons why so few cases entered the legal system. In the third section, we will
examine the legal doctrines that governed the workers' claims against USRC.
In the final section, we will examine how the basic "architecture of the legal
system" presented conditions that dramatically affected the chances of success
and recovery of the few claimants who entered the legal system and allowed
powerful defendants to fashion to their benefit the overall course and outcome
of the litigation.4
Carcinogenesis, 52 BULL. HIST. MED. 560 (1978); Claudia Clark, Physicians, Reformers,
and Occupational Disease: The Discovery ofRadium Poisoning, 12 WOMEN & HEALTH
147 (1987); Claudia Clark, Glowing in the Dark: The Radium Dialpainter, the
Consumers' League, and Industrial Health Reform in the United States, 1910-1935
(1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University); and Angela Nugent, The
Power to Define a New Disease: Epidemiological Politics and Radium Poisoning, in
DYING FOR WORK: WORKERS' SAFETY AND HEALTH IN TwENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
177-91 (David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz eds. 1987).
2. The leading plaintiff's attorney's files on the case are collected in the Raymond
Berry Papers, Papers on Radium Poisoning, National Consumer's League, Manuscripts
Division, Library of Congress, reels 1-3 [hereinafter RBP]; and Papers on Radium
Poisoning, National Consumers' League, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress,
reels 86-89 [hereinafter PNCL].
3. See, e.g., Tom Durkin & Robert Dingwall, Deconstructing Defense: Variations
in Asbestos Litigation, ABF Working Paper #9118 (1992).
4. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits ofLegal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REv. 95 (1974).
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II. THE DIAL PAINTERS AND RADIATION POISONING
The United States Radium Corporation's plant in Orange, New Jersey was
only one of many such facilities in the country.' The female workers, usually in
their late teens or early twenties, were employed to paint luminescent figures on
watch faces with radioactive paint. The procedure required the women to smooth
their camel-hair paint brushes in their mouths, a process known as "pointing" or
"tipping," dip the sharply pointed brush into the radioactive paint, and then paint
delicate figures on the watch faces. When the process was immediately
repeated, the women's mouths came into direct contact with the radioactive
residue on the brushes.' In addition, the women were exposed to considerable
background radiation in factories with ventilation purposefully restricted to slow
the drying process The women, paid two to three cents per dial, painted an
average of 200 watch faces daily, meaning they would "tip" their brush in their
mouths thousands of times a day. Aggravating exposure, the paint contained
gum acacia bind and proved easier to swallow than to spit.'
By the early 1920s many former dial painters began to suffer profound
dental and orthopedic problems, anemia, cancerous tumors in various parts of
their bodies, as well as a parade of other serious, but seemingly unconnected
illnesses. Between 1922 and 1933 twenty-two dial painters are known to have
died from radiation poisoning.9 In the early 1920s the National Consumer's
League, a workers' protection organization, staffed at the executive level almost
exclusively by women, attempted to help the women find a definitive diagnosis
for their illness, eliminate the source of the workplace danger, and help secure
financial compensation for injured and dying dial painters.10 By 1925 it was
clear that the women's illnesses were in some way connected to their work with
radioactive materials at the plant. Fredrick L. Hoffman had read a paper on the
topic before the American Medical Association's section on Preventative and
Industrial Medicine in May 1925, and articles on the incident were published in
August and September in the Journal of Industrial Hygiene and the Journal of
the American MedicalAssociation, respectively."
5. Nugent, supra note 1, at 178.
6. For a description of the painting process, see Effects of Use of Radioactive
Substances on the Health of Workers, 22 MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1926, at 18, 19-20.
7. Tony Bale, A Brush with Justice: The New Jersey Radium Dial Painters in the
Courts, HEALTHIPAc BuLL., Nov. 1987, at 18.
8. Gosling, supra note 1, at 11.
9. Bale, supra note 1, at 636.
10. See Clark, Glowing in the Dark, supra note 1,passim.
11. See Harrison S. Martland, Occupational Poisoning in Manufacture of
Luminous Watch Dials, 28 MONTHLY LAB. REv., June 1929, at 62, 67 n.13; see also
William B. Castle, Katherine R. Drinker & Cecil K. Drinker, Necrosis of the Jaw in
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Nevertheless, the women and their advocates found it difficult to secure
attorneys to sue USRC.12 In 1926 three suits against the corporation were settled
for $9,000, $3,000, and $1,000, but the attorney who brought these suits took no
more cases. Later that year the National Consumer's League convinced
Raymond Berry, a recent Harvard Law graduate, to represent five former
employees of USRC: Grace Fryer, Katherine Schaub, Albina Larice, Edna
Hussman, and Quinta McDonald. They would become known as the "Five
Doomed Women" and their case would become the most visible and illustrative
of the episode. Using Berry's legal files, which contain all correspondence and
documents filed in the case, as well as depositions, medical records, and experts'
reports, it is possible to analyze the course of the litigation.
Berry sued USRC on May 18, 1927.1 The women were unable to claim
relief under the workers' compensation statute because the provision contained
an exclusive listing of compensable occupational diseases such as anthrax, and
lead, mercury, phosphorus, and wood alcohol poisoning. Radiation poisoning,
a relatively new and rare malady, was not included on the list of compensable
diseases. 4 Their remedy, if any, had to be based on common law.
Consequently, the plaintiffs claimed that the corporation had breached a
common-law duty to provide a safe workplace for its employees. In addition,
the original complaint contended that the radioactive paint constituted an ultra-
hazardous material and should be subject to strict liability for any injuries
associated with its use.' Though the plaintiffs also filed a claim under a
negligence theory, it had little chance of success because few people had
knowledge of the dangers of low-level radiation in the early part of the century. 6
While there were no studies examining the low-level exposures experienced by
the dial painters, by the late 1910s and the early 1920s there was growing
evidence that ingestion of radioactive materials constituted some manner of
health risk. 7
Workers Employed in Applying a Luminous Paint Containing Radium, 7 J. INDUS.
HYGIENE 371 (1925); Fredrick L. Hoffman, Radium Mesothorium Necrosis, 85 JAMA
961l(March 26, 1925).
12. Bale, supra note 1, at 642.
13. Plaintiff's Original Complaint, New Jersey Supreme Court, Essex County, May
18, 1927, RBP, reel 1 [hereinafter Plaintiff's Original Complaint].
14. Martland, supra note 11, at 93-95; see also Sharpe, supra note 1, at 568.
15. Plaintiff s Original Complaint, supra note 13.
16. See, e.g., DAWSON TURNER, RADIUM: ITS PHYSICS AND THERAPEUTICS (1911);
BARTON HACKER, THE DRAGON'S TAIL: RADIATION SAFETY IN THE MANHATTAN
PROJECT, 1942-1946, at 19-22 (1987).
17. Bale, supra note 7, at 18; LAWRENCE BADASH, RADIOACTIVITY IN AMERICA:
GROWTH AND DECAY OF A SCIENCE (1979).
[Vol. 62
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USRC's central defense rested on the statute of limitations.'8 The women
had Pot worked in the watch factory in over five years and the New Jersey
statute of limitations demanded that suits be filed within two years of the
relevant injury. The statute of limitations defense, if viable, was especially
attractive to the corporation because most of the former employees had ceased
employment more than two years previous. The "discovery rule," a later legal
innovation, would have tolled the running of the statute, but in the 1920s the
women's only recourse was to petition a court of equity to avoid the harsh
consequence of the already expired limitations period.
The Five Doomed Women were dreadfully ill and many observers doubted
that they would live to see their suits concluded. Berry transferred their case to
the Court of Chancery in late 1927 to address the statute of limitations question,
an equity issue. The case was delayed there for nearly a year and ultimately
transferred back to the trial court. The women's pitiful condition (some weighed
as little as seventy pounds) and the seemingly heartless maneuvering of USRC
incited extensive media attention and public anger. In June 1928, four days
before trial, USRC settled the case of the Five Doomed Women for $50,000, a
yearly stipend, and medical expenses.' 9
Berry represented only one more dial painter. He settled Mae Canfield's
case in 1930, and like his predecessor, never filed another suit against USRC.
21
There were a handful of settlements before 1935 when a federal district court in
LaPorte v. United States Radium Corporation stated definitively that the statute
of limitations would bar any suits by dial workers against the company for their
employment many years previous.2' After LaPorte, there are no known suits or
settlements arising out work performed at the Orange, New Jersey watch plant.
III. NAMING, BLAMING, AND CLAIMING
Few of the victims of radium poisoning even tried to assert their claims
through the legal system. This is understandable from the viewpoint of the
sociology of disputes. For a victim of an occupational disease to seek a legal
remedy, she must discover that she has suffered an injury, assign responsibility
for that injury to another party, and be culturally and legally prepared to demand
compensation. Unperceived, unnameable injuries will never be litigated.
Likewise, injuries without identifiable culprits will not be compensated and
victims without the motivation or means to pursue a remedy will never sue.
18. Defendant's Original Answer, New Jersey Supreme Court, Essex County, RBP,
reel I [hereinafter Defendant's Original Answer].
19. Bale, supra note 1, at 642-45.
20. Letter from Raymond Berry to Alice Hamilton (April 2, 1930) RBP, reel 1.
21. LaPorte v. United States Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp. 263 (D.N.J. 1935).
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Legal sociologists William Felstiner, Richard Abel, and Austin Sarat have
described this process as three stages through which perceptions of injuries pass
before they are transformed into disputes ripe for litigation: "Naming,"
"Blaming," and "Claiming."'  Naming refers to the process by which
"unperceived injurious experience" is transformed into a "perceived injurious
experience." Blaming describes the transformation of a perceived injurious
experience into a grievance--"when a person attributes an injury to a fault of
another individual or social entity." Claiming "occurs when someone with a
grievance voices it to the person or entity believed to be responsible and asks for
some remedy." If that remedy is denied, then the claimant may resort to the
formal legal system for redress.'
The dial painters, and by extension, victims of other previously unknown
occupational diseases, faced severe obstacles at each stage of the naming,
blaming, and claiming process. Their experiences only slowly were perceived
as injuries, their injuries slowly characterized as articulable grievances against
their employer, and their grievances belatedly transformed into disputes.
Moreover, the slow evolution through the naming, blaming, and claiming
process shaped the form and the content of the lawsuits brought by the handful
of women who were able to reconceptualize their initial experiences into
concrete legal action and provided the United States Radium Corporation with
additional tactical advantages.
The first obstacle that potential dial-painter litigants faced was obtaining a
diagnosis for their symptoms and a name for their malady. With previously
unknown occupational diseases, this stage of the litigation process is the most
problematic and distorts the entire attempt to secure compensation for the
victims.24 Indeed, Amelia Maggia, the first known victim of dial painting, died
in 1922 without having suspected that she had suffered from radiation
poisoning.' As Katherine Wiley of the Consumer's League noted in January
22. William Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaiming, Claiming.... 15 L. & SoC'Y REv. 631 (1980-1981); see also Herbert
Kritzer et al., The Aftermath of Injury: Cultural Factors in Compensation Seeking in
Canada and the United States, 25 L. & Soc'Y REv. 501 (1991). Richard Abel has
applied the "naming, blaming, and claiming" framework to workers' exposure to toxic
chemicals. See Richard L. Abel, Risk as an Arena of Struggle, 83 MICH. L. REv. 772,
801-11 (1985).
23. Felstiner et al., supra note 22, at 633, 635, 636.
24. PETERS. BARTH& H.A. HUNT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-
RELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASES 273-74 (1980).
25. Survey of Industrial Poisoning from Radioactive Substances, 28 MONTHLY
LAB. REv., June 1929, at 20, 41-42 (case no. 2).
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1929, "it is all so new and insidious[,] one is dead or crippled before it is
discovered to be coming. "26
Because the disease was not diagnosed until years after the last exposure,
it is impossible to determine how many other women suffered from the disease.
Those who left the community and were not aware of the publicity surrounding
the Five Doomed Women may have never connected their illnesses and their
prior employment with USRC. Two workers, for example, worked for USRC
between 1917-1919 and were first told of the nature of their illness in 1925.27
The multiplicity of symptoms produced by the illness complicated the
identification of the women's complaints as a specific disease. Although most
well-known victims of the Orange, New Jersey plant suffered profound dental
problems, other symptoms varied widely and could have suggested any number
of maladies. Physicians initially mistook the symptoms for syphilis and
phosphorus poisoning. Women also suffered from pernicious anemia, blood
poisoning, necrosis of the jaw, cancerous tumors in diverse parts of the body,
kidney failure, meningitis, blood poisoning, pneumonia, and acute myocarditis. 2
Some women showed erratic blood counts; others did not. As one physician-
advocate for the dial painters noted, "Many [dial painters] may have gone to
other towns and died without physicians' being aware of what caused death...
A physician not acquainted with radium poisoning might treat such patients for
rheumatism or God knows what." '29
This vast array of symptoms complicated both the lay and professional task
of affixing a single label on the illness. The issue was confused further by the
fact that many former workers apparently had suffered no ill effects, or had
suffered in varying degrees of severity. Surely, if all the symptoms were the
result of the same occupational disease, women working at the same plant, doing
the same job, would show the same symptoms.
However, all women did not necessarily suffer the same exposure. Some
workers' tenure may have occurred during a period when brush-pointing was not
common. Some women "pointed" more frequently than others. In addition, it
is unclear whether brush-pointing was the sole source of contamination. Poor
ventilation and other incidental exposure may have contributed to different
symptoms for different women.30  Moreover, work habits, individual
susceptibility and resistance, preexisting conditions, and varying lengths of
26. Letter from Katherine Wiley to Florence Kelly (Jan. 9, 1929), Papers on
Radium Poisoning, National Consumers League ("PNCL"), Manuscripts Division,
Library of Congress, reel 86.
27. Stipulation for Chancery, (no date), RBP, reel 1.
28. Survey of Industrial Poisoningfrom Radioactive Substances, supra note 25,
at 40-60.
29. Lang, supra note 1, at 60 (quoting Harrison S. Martland).
30. Castle, Drinker & Drinker, supra note 11, at 378-79.
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exposure help explain why it was difficult to identify a single illness, and
discover its source."
USRC exploited the difficulty that investigators and workers experienced
in "naming" the injury they had received and in "blaming" the proper culprit.
The potential defendants recognized almost immediately the special problems
faced by the dial workers and employed a variety of tactical devices to assure
that the vast majority of claimants would never enter a courtroom. These tactics
also served a greater strategic purpose of delay that would aid the defendants in
those cases that actually entered the formal legal system.
In June 1925, after at least two suits had been filed and with other potential
litigants waiting in the wings, Arthur Roeder, president of USRC, issued a press
release on the suspected occupational disease. Roeder denied any possible
connection between the women's work and their physical suffering. He
explained that the women voiced a wide range of physical complaints that almost
certainly could not describe a single disease or cause. In addition, he declared,
"There are fifty other manufactories of this kind where similar operations are
conducted and never before has anything come up." Roeder attributed the high
incidence of illness at the Orange, New Jersey plant to other factors. Roeder
claimed that many of the women who had worked at the plant in the previous
decade "were unfit for more strenuous labor" and "when some of those already
in poor health declined normally it was said their handling of the paint was
responsible."3 Roeder made these statements after the company's own experts,
Katherine Drinker and Cecil Drinker from Harvard Medical School, had
informed him that conditions in the plant almost certainly had caused the
women's illness.33
Roeder's denials and explanations confounded and retarded the naming,
blaming, and claiming process in several ways. The assertions confused the
issue of whether the women were suffering from an ailment called radiation
poisoning, and undermined claims that women had contracted the illness at
work. The resulting uncertainty could discourage potential victims (and their
physicians) from recognizing that their set of symptoms constituted a specific
illness. The fact that scores of other, apparently similar, factories were
producing watches with no victims suggested that the workplace might not be
to blame. 4
31. Martland, supra note 11, at 63-65.
32. N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1925, at 1.
33. See Clark, Physicians, Reformers and Occupational Disease, supra note 1, at
152-55.
34. Alternatively, the absence of any apparent illness at other plants seemed to
support the corporation's claims that the danger was limited to the New Jersey factory.
Fredrick Hoffman, an early investigator of the episode, believed that the problem was
localized to the Orange plant and to the brush-pointing practice. Letter from Fredrick
[Vol. 62
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The doubts concerning the nature of the new illness, its causation and its
source, help explain why many victims never made it to a courtroom-they did
not know that they had been injured, or they did not know who, if anyone, to
blame. These same factors had a similar and perhaps equally important effect
on the legal profession. Lawyers play a central role in ushering their clients
through the blaming and claiming process. They help potential litigants
understand if blame can be assigned to an injury and the range of available legal
remedies.35
In the dial-painter episode, the uncertainty surrounding both diagnosis and
causation of the women's symptoms affected the legal community's view of the
viability of legal action. Typically, personal-injury attorneys took cases on a
contingency basis, i.e. for a percentage of the final award with no charge if the
plaintiff recovered nothing. However, in the dial-painting cases, attorneys, if
they were willing to accept the cases, demanded a fee in advance. The value of
their time, cost of investigation and expert witnesses, and the low probability of
success combined to make attorneys hesitant to offer their services. The women,
however, were not in a position to pay legal fees. Before Raymond Berry agreed
to take Schaub's case, "each of the other attorneys" whom Schaub had
approached "felt it was hopeless to try and collect damages from the radium
company. 36 Fryer, too, first approached a lawyer who demanded a retainer,
presumably because he expected no recovery. Various attorneys told Fryer,
Schaub, Larice, and McDonald that the statute of limitations barred their suit and
refused to accept the case.37 Kuser and Carlough likewise could not find
attorneys without payment in advance. Without attorneys, the women were left
to work out the subtle causation and culpability problems on their own.
Consequently, many women probably never discovered whom to blame or if
they deserved compensation.
USRC's contention that its plant was not culpable because other similar
plants produced no victims was compelling. Even Berry admitted, as late as
1927, that the fact there were no known cases at other locations suggested that
the Orange, New Jersey plant was not connected with the illness.3 In retrospect,
this reasoning was severely flawed. Many women did not realize they were
suffering from radiation poisoning and, therefore, could not report their disease.
USRC also settled claims of women from other plants out of court at an early
stage, escaping the damaging publicity that surrounded the New Jersey cases.
Hoffman to Florence Kelly (June 10, 1926), PNCL, reel 86.
35. Felstiner et al., supra note 22, at 645-47.
36. Katherine Schaub, Radium, 68 SuRvEy 138, 139 (May 1, 1932).
37. Legal Memorandum, RBP, reel 1; Letter from Katherine Wiley to Alice
Hamilton (April 4, 1925), RBP, reel 3.
38. Letter from Raymond Berry to Alice Hamilton (Dec. 15, 1927), RBP, reel 3.
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Perhaps most significantly, the New Jersey plant apparently differed from
other ostensibly similar establishments and generated injuries sooner than plants
in other parts of the country. The radioactive material used in the New Jersey
plant contained predominantly mesothorium with smaller amounts of radium. 39
Mesothorium, an isotope of radium, has a faster rate of atomic decay, and
therefore, emits greater amounts of radiation in the first few years following its
ingestion.' It has a half-life of approximately seven years as opposed to nearly
1700 years for radium. Radium is potentially more potent and would ultimately
injure workers, but mesothorium could be more dangerous in the short-term and
yield symptoms at an earlier stage of the process.
In the context of the New Jersey cases, this distinction meant that the
Orange plant dial painters would exhibit symptoms sooner than workers in plants
where radium was the predominant radioactive material. By the late 1920s and
early 1930s, workers in other plants, such as that located in Ottawa, Illinois,
were also showing symptoms of radiation poisoning.' Indeed, in the earliest
diagnosed cases, mesothorium predominated. In the later cases, radium was the
most commonly detected radioactive material.42
Finally, the New Jersey plant specialized in the painting of inexpensive,
paper-watch faces as opposed to the metal, porcelain, or enamel dials painted at
other plants. Paper-watch faces required a water-based, gum-arabic adhesive
and a camel-hair brush. Painters frequently resorted to the pointing process to
straighten the brush hairs. In contrast, painters used an oil-varnish paint on
metal, porcelain, and enamel dials. Stylus and metal pins, rather than brushes,
were used to apply oil-varnish paint. Therefore, "pointing" was unnecessary.
When brushes were used, the oil-varnish paint helped the brush retain its shape
better and made pointing less necessary. Finally, the bitter taste of the oil-
varnish paint discouraged pointing and ingestion.43
These variations in work experience complicated the ability to determine
the causation of the dial workers' illness and consequently the ability of workers
39. Effects of use of Radioactive Substances on the Health of Workers, supra note
6, at 19-20.
40. Effects of Use of Radioactive Substances on the Health of Workers, supra note
6, at 28; IndustrialAccidents and Hygiene, 22 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 1926, at 171,
172.
41. John Conroy, Radium City: On Cancer, Clock Dials, and Ottawa, Illinois, a
Town that Failed to See the Light, READER: CHICAGO'S FREE WEEKLY, June 22, 1984,
at 28.
42. Letter from Ethelbert Stewart to Florence Kelly (Dec. 16, 1927), RBP, reel 3;
Letter from Fredrick Hoffinan to Raymond Berry (Dec. 19, 1927), RBP, reel 3; see also
Malignant Growths Resulting from Exposure to Radioactive Substances, 34 MONTHLY
LAB. REv., April, 1932, at 809, 811.
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to blame with confidence the appropriate parties. When the president of USRC
claimed that the lack of consistent symptoms and industry-wide incidence
undermined the dial painters' allegations, he merely was exploiting existing
ambiguities in the case.
Other USRC tactics were more contrived, focusing primarily on delaying
tactics to undermine the plaintiffs' factual and legal cases. The Drinkers' report
concluded that the dial painters' working conditions somehow were responsible
for the workers' symptoms." Despite repeated requests by the Consumer's
League and the Drinkers themselves, USRC refused to release the report to the
public until mid-1925. Roeder told the Drinkers, alternatively, that the report
must have been mistaken because there were no problems at other plants, that all
the evidence was circumstantial, and, finally, that pending litigation must delay
publication of the report.4" When the Drinkers decided to release their report
without USRC's permission, the company's attorney informed them that he was
"astonished" that they would consider publication. The report, he argued, was
commissioned in anticipation of lawsuits and while the corporation did not
expect the Drinkers to falsify their findings, it did expect the researchers to
withhold the report if it uncovered damaging evidence.46 The Drinkers
ultimately published their report but during the one-year delay, USRC officials
told injured dial workers, consumer groups, government investigators, and
lawyers that the Drinker report exonerated, not condemned, conditions in the
plant.47 This deception made it more difficult for potential plaintiffs to assign
appropriate blame for their conditions and demand remuneration.
USRC's other medical experts served the important function of
undermining the dial painters' attempts to receive a conclusive diagnosis and
helped muddle the causation issues.48 Fredrick Flinn, who served as a consultant
for the corporation through the entire episode, played a central role. He entered
the picture soon after it became clear that the Drinkers' report did not absolve
44. Castle, Drinker & Drinker, supra note 11, at 377-78.
45. Letter from Arthur Roeder to Cecil Drinker (June 6, 1924); Letter from Arthur
Roeder to Cecil Drinker (June 13, 1924); Letter from Arthur Roeder to Cecil Drinker
(June 18, 1924); Letter from Arthur Roeder to Cecil Drinker (June 24, 1924); Letter from
Arthur Roeder to Cecil Drinker (April 9, 1925). These letters were reproduced as part
of a deposition of Cecil Drinker conducted on November 14, 1927. RBP, reel 1.
46. Letter from Cecil Drinker to Arthur Roeder (April 29, 1925); Letter from Josiah
Stryker to Cecil Drinker (n.d.), reproduced as part of a deposition of Cecil Drinker
conducted on November 14, 1927, RBP, reel 1.
47. See, e.g., Letter from Alice Hamilton to Cecil and Katherine Drinker (April 4,
1925), RBP, reel 3; Letter from Arthur Roeder to Katherine Wiley (Jan. 9, 1925), RBP,
reel 3; Letter from Arthur Roeder to Katherine Wiley (Jan. 19, 1925), RBP, reel 3;
Stipulation for Chancery, RBP, reel 1.
48. For a fuller discussion of the role of medical experts in the radium dial episode,
see Clark, Physicians, Reformers and Occupational Diseases, supra note 1, passim.
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USRC.49 When the Consumer's League or other advocates for the dial painters
contacted USRC to ask for assistance or information, the corporation suggested
that they contact Flinn for advice." Flinn also struck out on his own. Although
he did not hold a medical degree, he sought out affected workers and asked to
examine them." He invariably informed them that they had not been affected
by working at the New Jersey plant. 2 Flinn told Florence Kelly of the
Consumer's League that the women's health problems had been caused by
nerves. 3 He also conducted a public campaign. His 1926 report in the Joumal
of the American Medical Association concluded that there was no industrial
hazard connected with dial painting. Instead, he attributed the women's
symptoms to congenital problems, syphilis, bacterial infections, and other
causes.54 Flinn published his "findings" even though earlier in the year he had
admitted to the Drinkers that radioactive material was involved in the dial
painters' illness.55
Once litigation began, Flinn examined the women as an official
representative of the defendant company and reported that the former dial
painters showed no signs of radioactivity. He conducted tests with an
electrometer, an instrument designed to detect radiation emanating from a
victim's body. Flinn reportedly either held the instrument two to three feet from
the subject allowing the radiation to dissipate before reaching the device, or held
the instrument in such a way that a table blocked the path of the rays to the
device.56
Flinn served two important functions for USRC. First, he provided the
corporation with grounds for plausible deniability. He held a Ph.D. and was an
assistant professor of industrial hygiene at Columbia University. Although his
opinions were widely suspect, his credentials gave him the appearance of
credibility. The company could claim a good-faith belief in its refusal to admit
responsibility and offer compensation because it was supported by scientific
49. Letter from Raymond Berry to Alice Hamilton (June 20, 1927), RBP, reel 3.
50. Sworn affidavit of Katherine Wiley, dated July 16, 1927, PNCL, reel 86.
51. See, e.g., Transcript of Katherine Schaub's direct examination in Court of
Chancery, RBP, reel 2.
52. Letter from Fredrick Flinn to Katherine Schaub (Dec. 7, 1925), RBP, reel 3;
Letter from Katherine Wiley to Edward Katzenbach (Feb. 23, 1928), RBP, Reel 3, Letter
from Raymond Berry to Walter Lippman (June 16, 1927), RBP, reel 3; Stipulation for
Chancery, RBP, reel 1; Clark, Physicians, Reformers and Occupational Disease, supra
note 1, at 160.
53. Letter from Florence Kelly to Alice Hamilton (July 11, 1928), PNCL, reel 86.
54. Fredrick Flinn, Radioactive Material: An Industrial Hazard?, 87 JAMA 2078,
2078-81 (Dec. 18, 1926).
55. Clark, Physicians, Reformers and Occupational Disease, supra note 1, at 161.
56. Survey of Industrial Poisoning, supra note 25, at 77; Letter from Raymond
Berry to K.B. Krumbbaar (Nov. 21, 1928), RBP, reel 3.
[Vol. 62
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss2/2
RADIUM DL4L WORKERS
evidence. Second, and perhaps more important, Flinn was able to keep some
victims out of the litigation process entirely. Flinn discouraged the workers from
pursuing legal action by telling them that they were healthier than he was, or by
arguing that dial painting had nothing to do with their illness. Flinn effectively
could dampen publicity by keeping victims out of court, and, without publicity,
many women and their physicians would not connect their illness and their work
experience.
Berry was aware of these tactics and, after Flinn gave Katherine Schaub a
clean bill of health, Berry demanded that Flinn cease contact with any of his
clients while there was litigation pending." Flinn's efforts hampered potential
litigants in their quest to name their illness and in their search for culprits to
blame. Although Berry eventually warned Flinn away, there is no way to
determine how many former dial painters he contacted and persuaded to forego
legal action.
When Flinn could not convince a dial painter that she was healthy, or that
her illness was unrelated to USRC, he kept her out of court by quietly settling
her case. A physician treating some of the women at an orthopedic hospital
recounted that Flinn had volunteered his services in 1927 and 1928 to help treat
radiation victims. Flinn told the physician that he had settled radiation poisoning
cases out of court in Connecticut "and could have done so in N.J. if the matter
had not been badly handled."58 Flinn also admitted to a representative of the
Consumer's League that he was involved in settling cases.59 Flinn's role is
instructive because it illustrates how ingenious defendants can slow the entry of
cases into the formal legal process. If Flinn could not deter the women from
naming their illness, or blaming his employers, he could at least stop them from
filing lawsuits by offering a quiet settlement. In these negotiations, Flinn held
the upper hand. He knew what he wanted and the women he dealt with were
invariably young, unsophisticated, vulnerable, and without the benefit of legal
counsel.
Berry, on the other hand, had a difficult time securing expert testimony for
the women. Late into the litigation, Berry was desperately struggling to find a
qualified and willing expert. Many of the scientists, physicians, and
investigators who helped- uncover the disease refused to testify in court.6"
57. Letter from Fredrick Flinn to Katherine Schaub (Dec. 7, 1925), RBP, reel 3
(asking to examine her); Letter from Katherine Wiley to Edward Katzenbach (Feb. 23,
1928), RBP, reel 3 (Flinn told Schaub that nothing is wrong); Letter from Raymond
Berry to Fredrick Flinn (Feb. 1, 1928), RBP, reel 3 (Berry tells Flinn to stay away from
his clients).
58. Letter from Raymond Berry to Fredrick Flinn (Jan. 2, 1928), RBP, reel 3.
59. Letter from Alice Hamilton to Raymond Berry (Jan. 5, 1928), RBP, reel 3.
60. For examples of Berry's problems in securing expert witnesses, see Letter from
Cecil Drinker to Raymond Berry (June 7, 1927), RBP, reel 3; Letter from Harrison
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Berry's predicament underscores another advantage defendant corporations
usually possess in occupational disease cases. The plaintiff's attorney rarely has
contact with the highly specialized world of science and may not know which,
or what kind of, expert to approach for help. In addition, the funds needed to
pay such an expert are often in short supply. Defendant corporations, however,
usually maintain an intimate connection with the scientific circles that affect
their particular industry. Therefore, they can easily identify and employ the
appropriate expert who is most likely to help them with their defense.
The fact that many dial painters were never able to name their disease, or
blame the appropriate culprit helped keep all but a few women out of the
courtroom. However, more subtle and less visible factors may have also
discouraged litigation. A lawsuit is not an automatic response to a wrong.
6
'
Cultural attitudes and customs define socially acceptable ways to respond to
grievances and disputes. As legal anthropologist Carol Greenhouse has
observed, "[b]efore a person can sue, he must have not only a legally justiciable
issue and a legal forum, but also a personal conceptualization of conflict that is
adversarial in structure and remedial in orientation. '62 Individual action,
therefore, is shaped by community beliefs and personal moral codes about the
type of wrongs that merit legal action. For example, some studies have
suggested that cohesive, tightly-knit communities discourage personal injury
lawsuits.63
Prevailing sentiment in Orange, New Jersey, a relatively small community,
may have discouraged the dial painters from claiming damages from USRC even
after they suspected its liability. Dial-painter claimants, in fact, did not enjoy the
full support of public opinion. Ethel Metz, who filed a suit against USRC in
1929, found that many members of the community distrusted her attempts to
claim damages from USRC. She reported that, after news of her suit surfaced,
she had "been severely criticized by her neighbors. No one seems to sympathize
with her.. ."I Dial painters were especially subject to community suspicion
Martland to Alice Hamilton, (July 11, 1927), RBP, reel 3; Letter from Raymond Berry
to Fredrick Hoffman (July 22, 1927), RBP, reel 3; Letter from Herman L. Blumgart to
Raymond Berry, (Aug. 15, 1927), RBP, reel 3.
61. Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443,
448-52 (1987).
62. Carol J. Greenhouse, Nature is to Culture as Praying is to Suing: Legal
Pluralism in an American Suburb, 20 J. LEG. PLURALISM 17, 17 (1982).
63. See, e.g., David Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and
Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 L. & Soc'y REv. 551 (1984);
CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, AND COMMUNITY
IN AN AMERICAN TOWN (1986); see also Abel, supra note 61, at 450-5 1.
64. Detective Report of Elizabeth C. Lewis (March 22, 1930), at 12, "Metz Case
File," Argonne Radium Dial Project, Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont, Illinois.
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because their illness did not always provide visible symptoms to the casual
observer. Metz felt that she received little community support "because she is
so active and looks so well and they [neighbors] tell her that they cannot see
anything wrong with her."65 Ultimately, newspaper publicity appeared to turn
public sentiment in favor of the dial-painter victims. However, during the early
and important stages of the naming, blaming, and claiming process, many
victims may have been discouraged from seeking legal redress. Some victims
may not have approached lawyers, and others may have delayed long enough to
allow the statute of limitations to extinguish their right to bring a lawsuit.
The power of community opinion may, in many instances, play a role in the
dynamic of contemporary occupational disease claims. Even today, many
communities remain hostile to personal injury.' The stigma attached to legal
action could be heightened when the corporate defendant is an important and
popular employer in the community. Where these attributes exist, individual
litigants may be less likely to sue for their injuries or may alter the way they
pursue compensation.
The defense team for USRC was aware of the importance and power of
public attitudes in the case and searched for ways to discredit the victims.
During the Metz lawsuit, USRC attorneys employed detectives to interview the
family and friends of dial painters. Investigators' reports focused on aspects of
Metz's personal life that were unrelated to any factual or legal defense. One
account from a New York detective reported "that neither Mrs. Metz or her
family bears a good reputation" and "that Mrs. Metz has several boy friends and
they very frequently ... go out on wild parties."'67 Another investigator revealed
that Ms. Metz's son had been conceived before marriage. The report suggested
that the investigator would be able to secure additional information about a
recent "illicit relation" between Metz and "a man not her husband. 68
It is unclear how the defense team planned to use this inflammatory
information. The details of dial painters' private lives did not illuminate the
cause or extent of the women's illnesses but the information could have provided
defense attorneys with leverage in settlement negotiations and encouraged some
claimants to forego litigation to avoid exposure of embarrassing, personal habits
to the rest of the community.
The activities of the defense detectives underscore another intrinsic
advantage held by corporate defendants. USRC was able to employ
65. Id.
66. Engel, supra note 63, passim.
67. Detective Report of William J. McCarthy (March 24, 1930), at 2, "Metz Case
File," Argonne Radium Dial Project, Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont, Illinois.
68. Detective Report of E.A. Markley to Collins & Corbin (attorneys for USRC)
(April 21, 1930), at 1-2, "Metz Case File," Argonne Radium Dial Project, Argonne
National Laboratory, Lemont, Illinois.
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investigators to watch claimants around the clock for weeks.69 One detective
suggested that the defense secretly film one of the dial painters to demonstrate
to the jury how effortlessly she walked.7" Because USRC faced dozens if not
hundreds of potential lawsuits, the corporation could justify spending large sums
of money on early cases. If the first claimants were unsuccessful, the likelihood
of future suits would diminish drastically. While USRC could draw on corporate
coffers to conduct their investigation, the individual dial painters had to rely on
their own funds, advanced money from attorneys, or help from groups such as
the Consumer's League.
If social stigma and public opinion discouraged some victims from seeking
a legal remedy, others may have been affected by gender-based attitudes toward
legal action. Historian Barbara Welke has observed that "the fact of personal
injury and the legal response to injury were social events first," involving
"gender-differentiated bodies of women and men, acting out gender-
differentiated lives, on a gender-differentiated terrain, and suffering gender-
differentiated injuries."' Remnants of the dominant nineteenth-century feminine
ethos of self-sacrifice and responsibility to others may have influenced the dial
workers' response to misfortune. As Carol Gilligan has observed, "the ethic of
self sacrifice is directly in conflict with the concept of rights that has, in this part
of the century, supported women's claims to a fair share of social justice."72 As
a result, in the words of Robin West, women's concept of value has traditionally
"revolve[d] not around the axis of autonomy, individuality, justice, and rights,
as does men's, but instead around the axis of intimacy, nurturance, community,
responsibility and care."73
Given this perspective, women may have felt unfamiliar and uneasy
asserting their individual rights instead of accepting misfortune without protest.
By the 1920s the ethos of pure self-sacrifice had become attenuated and women
in a variety of contexts felt free to demand their rights. However, the surviving
remnants of the sentiment, and an impulse toward other-directness, may have
influenced some women and made them less likely to ask for relief for
themselves. Anthony Bale, who studied work-related diseases in a variety of
industries, found that when women became ill, their "symptoms would often be
attributed to hysteria, to a combination of mental and physical weakness rather
69. Detective Report of William J. McCarthy (March 24, 1930), at 2, "Metz Case
File," Argonne Radium Dial Project, Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont, Illinois.
70. Report of E.A. Markley, supra note 68, at 1-2.
71. Barbara Y. Welke, Unreasonable Women: Gender and the Law ofAccidental
Injury, 1870-1920, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 369, 371 (1994).
72. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 128-136 (1986); see also Joan M. Shaughnessy, Gilligan's
Travels, 7 LAw & INEQ. J. 1 (1988).
73. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 28 (1988).
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than to working conditions" and that they typically were "less likely to file a
claim than their male counterparts..."I
Certainly not all women avoided legal action.75 Two factors may have
overcome some of the dial painters' reluctance. The National Consumer's
League, run virtually exclusively by women, played a vital role in providing
emotional, technical, and legal encouragement to the injured dial painters. The
League served as a support community of women that not only provided tangible
aid, but could have also helped overcome the reluctance the dial painters may
have had in asserting their claims.76
More importantly, the dial painters' concern for their families played a
central role in their decision to sue their former employer. The feminine
mentality continued to be colored by a care-based ethos that elevated community
and family values.77 Industrial disease affects a range of individuals far beyond
the presently known victims. The families of the victims also suffer, both
financially and emotionally. Other workers, present and future, in similar
occupations, may also be in danger from the industrial hazard that injured the
known victims. Therefore, the type of action early victims decide to pursue can
have a dramatic impact on a wide range of individuals and groups by exposing
occupational dangers and publicizing available remedies. This function is
especially important in occupational disease where diagnosis of the injury is
difficult and causation insidious.
Although evidence is scant and qualitative, the dial painters do not appear
to represent individuals demanding remuneration for solely selfish reasons.
Instead, the women seemed equally concerned with the burden on their husbands
and families. Katherine Schaub said she sued USRC in the hope that she "could
claim enough compensation to relieve the family of their heavy financial
burden."78 Schaub told a newspaper reporter after her case was settled, "First
I am going to repay my father and sister as much as I can, for the sacrifices they
have made me these last three years." Similarly, Larice exclaimed "I am glad
to have the money because now my husband won't have to work so hard to get
me the little luxuries and necessities I need."79 The women, in part, also shared
the motivation of their supporters in the Consumer's League: helping and
74. Anthony Bale, "Hope in Another Direction": Compensation for Work-Related
llness Among Women 1900-1960, Part I, WOMEN & HEALTH, Spring 1989, at 81, 83.
75. Id.
76. For the vital role played by the National Consumer's League, and its local arm,
the New Jersey Consumer's League, see id. at 85.
77. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE
L.J. 1373, 1380 et seq. (1986); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 580-82 (1986).
78. Schaub, supra note 36, passim.
79. Quoted in news clipping from Ledger (June 6, 1928), RBP, reel 2.
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protecting other workers throughout the industry, and the larger community, by
uncovering the truth and exposing the dangers on a national scale." This
motivation, too, is consistent with the notion that women maintain a connection,
and a sense of responsibility, to the rest of the world that men may not.8 Studies
of plaintiff motivation in personal injury suits have contended that plaintiffs want
more than mere financial compensation. In addition, plaintiffs want a full
explanation of what happened to them, they want their story told, and, they want
to help and protect other victims and potential victims.8" These goals, also held
by the Consumer's League, may have helped the Five Doomed Women
overcome whatever social and cultural hesitancy they had in facing the
defendants in court. It is unclear how much impact cultural forces had on
individual decisions to sue for injuries, but cultural forces are the type of
intangible influences all plaintiffs face before bringing their grievances to court.
IV. THE OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS OF FORMAL LAW
For those dial painters who pursued legal claims for their injuries, the next
hurdles they faced were harsh formal law and an unresponsive legal process.
Lawrence M. Friedman has termed personal injury law between 1880 and 1910
a "system of noncompensation." It was a system of noncompensation because
of the legal doctrines that impeded recovery and other barriers that reflected the
"resources and power" of defendants.83 Trial courts, according to Friedman and
Thomas D. Russell, were a component of a system "that sifted and discouraged
plaintiffs, allowing only a persistent, lucky few to win favorable verdicts and
compensation for their injuries.""
Occupational disease litigation in the 1920s and 1930s also may be
understood primarily as a system of noncompensation. None of the victims of
radiation poisoning in the New Jersey cases won a favorable verdict from a
court. A "persistent lucky few" received cash settlements out of court. Anthony
80. For other suggestions that women litigants frequently pursued a wider, more
altruistic agenda, see Bale, supra note 74, at 83-84; Alice Kessler-Harris, Protection for
Women: Trade Unions and Labor Laws, in DOUBLE ExPosuRE: WOMEN'S HEALTH
HAZARDS ON THE JOB AND AT HOME 139-154 (Wendy Chaukin ed. 1984).
81. West, supra note 73, at 15; Sherry, supra note 77, passim.
82. Mindi Miller, "I Want My Story Told": An Anthropological Analysis of
Malpractice Plaintiffs' Discourse (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice
University).
83. Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late 19th
Century, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 351; Lawrence M. Friedman & Thomas D. Russell,
More Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Litigation, 1901-1910,34 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 295
(1990); see also Thomas D. Russell, Historical Study of Personal Injury Litigation, 1 GA.
J. S. LEGAL. HIST. 109 (1991).
84. Friedman & Russell, supra note 83, at 295.
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Bale, in his study of workers' compensation in the United States concluded, that
"this most publicized occupational disease of the twenties led to some
considerable financial recoveries in the tort system, although most victims were
uncompensated or badly under compensated."85
At the time of the dial-painter episode, most American jurisdictions did not
include occupational diseases in their workers compensation systems.8 6 Only six
state or federal schemes provided for compensation for any disease arising from
employment." Eight other states, including New Jersey, compensated only
certain, specifically designated, occupational diseases.88 Seventeen states
expressly excluded all injuries not attributable to an accidental injury. 9 Courts
of fifteen states found that the use of the phrase "injury by accident" or similar
designations, meant that legislatures intended to limit the scope of compensation
and precluded the coverage of occupational disease under workers'
compensation. 90
New Jersey passed its first workers' compensation law in 1911.91 The act
provided for compensation for "injuries received . . . in the course of
employment." Like other compensation acts of this period, the law represented
"a compromise system. Each side gave a little, got a little."' For workers, the
act abolished the employer's use of the common-law defenses of assumption of
the risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant rule.94 These defenses
barred recovery if the worker knew about the risk before the injury, if the worker
failed to exercise appropriate care, or if the harm was caused by the injured
employee's co-workers.95 This "unholy trinity" of defenses often had been used
by corporate defendants to defeat liability in tort lawsuits.96
85. Bale, supra note 1, at 644-46.
86. Robert H. Canan, Comment, Industrial Law: Workmen's Compensation:
Occupational Diseases and the Statute of Limitations, 24 CAL. L. REV. 594, 594 n.4
(1936).
87. William W. Rabinovitz, Compensation of Occupational Diseases from a Legal
Viewpoint, 12 Wis. L. REV. 198, 204-05 (1937).
88. Id. at 204 n.28.
89. Id. at 202.
90. Id. at 202-04.
91. Act of April 4, 1911, ch. 95, 1911 N.J. ACTS 134-45.
92. Act of April 4, 1911, ch. 95, 1911 N.J. ACTS 134.
93. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 682-83 (2d ed.
1985).
94. Act of April 4, 1911, ch. 95, 1911 N.J. ACTS at 135.
95. Leslie I. Boden, Workers' Compensation, in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH:
RECOGNIZING AND PREVENTING WORK-RELATED DISEASE 149 (Barry S. Levey & David
H. Wegman eds., 2d ed. 1988); Friedman, supra note 83, at 356-58.
96. Sherry Brandt-Rauf, Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease: The
Case of Cancer, 2 OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 189, 189 (1987).
1997]
19
DeVille and Steiner: Deville: New Jersey Radium Dial Workers
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
MISSOURILAW REVIEW
The original New Jersey statute, like many other workers' compensation
laws, did not provide for compensation for occupational disease claims.97
Occupational disease was not a central concern of the framers of the early
compensation statutes and "played little part in the deliberations and struggles
leading to passage of the first compensation laws."98 Consequently, workers'
compensation laws were based upon a model of accidental injury.9 As Sherry
Brandt-Raufnotes, "the cases that arose based on disease did not easily fit within
that framework." '
New Jersey first brought occupational diseases under its workers'
compensation statute in 1924. The 1911 law was amended to include
"compensation for personal injuries to or for death of such employee by any of
the compensable occupational diseases" that were listed in a schedule.'0' These
diseases were compensable only if "arising out of and in the course" of
employment. The statute initially listed only nine diseases."° In 1926, as a
result of the publicity surrounding the dial painters' case, "mesothorium or
radium necrosis" was added to the schedule of compensable diseases. Harrison
Martland noted that many workers would die from radiation related causes
without any jaw necrosis and would remain ineligible for compensation under
this limited provision. 3 Nor could this amendment be applied retrospectively. 1"1
The dial-painter claimants were left with common-law remedies only. The
American Labor Legislation Review lamented that New Jersey remained in the
"antiquated damage suit stage" of compensation.' 5
The restrictive compensation schedule for occupational diseases was
absolute, and was designed as an-obstacle that could not be overcome. As the
American Labor Legislation Review noted, "Under this system the victims of
occupational diseases which do not appear on the list are denied
compensation.""16 The legislatures that framed these restrictions apparently
feared that "blanket coverage" of all occupational disease would "convert the
law into a measure of health insurance and thus cover injuries to health
97. Herod v. Mutual Chem. Co. of America, 180 A. 432, 432 (N.J. 1935).
98. Bale, supra note 1, at 444.
99. Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REv. 916,
916-17 (1980).
100. Brandt-Rauf, supra note 96, at 189.
101. Act of March 11, 1924, ch. 124,1924 N.J. ACTS 230-33.
102. Act of March 11, 1924, ch. 124, 1924N.J. ACTS at 231.
103. Bale, supra note 1, at 645.
104. Sharpe, supra note 1, at 568.
105. New Jersey Radium Again, 20 AM. LAB. LEGIs. REv. 60 (1930).
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indefinitely."'' 7 The American Association for Labor Legislation ("AALL"),
"the principal 'think tank' and national lobbying organization concerned with
protective labor legislation," believed that the lesson of the New Jersey dial-
painter cases was the unjust operation of the "discredited limited schedule of
compensable occupational diseases."'03 In 1928, the AALL organ concluded
that "this sad business in New Jersey indicates again the urgent need for
providing accident compensation for all occupational diseases."" John B.
Andrews of the AALL concluded in 1927 that "equal protection under adequate
accident compensation would in this case have protected not only the
unfortunate victims of the occupational disease but would also have protected
with all fairness their employer and the community as well."" Andrews
reminded his readers that the Association had urged the New Jersey legislature
to extend the protection of worker compensation to "all victims of occupational
disease instead of merely to those included in a limited list, pointing out that
great injustice would otherwise be done.""'
Andrews was wrong in suggesting that the dial-painter claimants would
have obtained compensation but for the limited schedule. Claimants faced other,
nearly as formidable, barriers. The New Jersey compensation statute also
included an especially harsh time limitation for filing claims. The state was the
only jurisdiction that had enacted separate statutes of limitations for traumatic
injuries as distinguished from disease-related injuries."'
Workers' compensation laws in the 1920s and 1930s provided a time limit
within which a claimant was forced to file her claim. A 1936 study of
limitations for filing claims for occupational diseases found that one of the most
difficult problems was determining when the statutory clock on these claims
began to run." 3 Most jurisdictions in the 1930s held that the statute did not
begin to run until the "disease is manifested." The sole exception, according to
107. Fred Wilcox, The "Schedule" Fraud in Occupational Disease Compensation,
24 AM. LAB. LEGIs. REV. 119, 121 (1934); see also Bale, supra note 1, at 559-62.
108. Joseph F. Tripp, Law and Social Control: Historians' Views of Progressive-
Era Labor Legislation, 28 LAB. HIST. 447, 476 (1987); New Jersey Radium Cases-The
Lesson, 18 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REv. 388 (1928).
109. New Jersey Radium Cases-The Lesson, 18 AM. LAB. LEGIs. REv. 388 (1928).
110. John B. Andrews, Compensate ALL Occupational Diseases, 17 AM. LAB.
LEGIS. REV. 261, 263 (1927).
111. Id.
112. Canan, supra note 86, at 595 n.6.
113. Canan, supra note 86, at 595; see generally Comment, Dust Disease and the
Statute of Limitations in Pennsylvania, 3 U. PA. L. REv. 192 (1937); Samuel Estep &
Walter Allan, Radiation Injuries and Time Limitations in Workmen's Compensation
Cases, 62 MICH. L. REv. 260 (1963); Patrick Kelley, Statutes of Limitations in the Era
of Compensation Systems: Workmen's Compensation Limitations Provisions for
Accidental Injury Claims, 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 541.
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the study, was the New Jersey statute. That statute "provid[ed] that the claim for
compensation for an occupational disease injury shall be barred unless a petition
is filed within one year after the date on which the employee ceased to be
exposed to such occupational disease."'"4 Thus, the statute of limitations for the
common-law actions brought by the New Jersey claimants was actually more
liberal that the workers' compensation time limitation.
Even though the tort filing time limit was longer and more forgiving, the
statute of limitations proved the major obstacle to recovery in common-law
based suits. A memorandum prepared by USRC attorneys summarized the
importance of statute of limitations for the defense.
One of our pleadings is the so-called Statute of Limitations, which based on
broad terms, means that unless an injury as a result of occupational injury
manifests itself and Action started within two years from the last date of
employment of plaintiff by defendant, the case is barred by law. Practically
all of our plaintiffs in the radium cases ceased their employment
approximately ten years prior to bringing suit."1
The New Jersey statute of limitations that applied to tort causes of actions
provided that such lawsuits "shall be commenced and instituted within two years
next after the cause of such action shall have accrued and not after."'" 6
In Freeman v. Conover, New Jersey's highest court held that the statute of
limitations was an absolute bar even where the defendant had fraudulently
concealed his wrongdoing."7 The court, quoting an earlier New Jersey case,
declared that "time alone settles the rights of the parties, by the giant force of the
statute.""' New Jersey law left one opening for a plaintiff seeking to avoid the
harsh operation of the statute of limitations. While a fraudulent act by a
defendant that induced delay in the bringing of a lawsuit by a plaintiff is not a
bar to a plea of limitations in an "action at law," "appropriate and adequate relief
under such circumstances may be afforded the plaintiff by and application to the
Court of Chancery."' 9 As the court in LaPorte v. United States Radium Corp.
explained, "a person who has been wronged by fraud is relieved from the bar of
the statute of limitations at law by a unique method. The plaintiff goes into the
114. Canan, supra note 86, at 595 n.6; see also Act of March 11, 1924, ch.124, 124
N.J. Laws 230, 232-33.
115. LaPorte v. United States Radium Corp., Memorandum for Scientific
Witnesses (Aug. 28, 1934), "Radium, Historical and Background Material vol. 2,"
Argonne Radium Dial Project, Argonne National Laboratory.
116. LaPorte v. United States Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp. 263, 272 (D.N.J. 1935).
117. Freeman v. Conover, 112 A. 324,326 (N.J. 1920).
118. Id. at 325 (quoting Thorpe v. Corwin, 20 N.J.L. 311, 316 (1844)).
119. Id. at 326.
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Court of Chancery and enjoins the plea of the statute at law."'20 The case of the
Five Doomed Women was played out in chancery court. Berry confessed in
May 1928 that he wanted to stay out of the court of law because he did not want
to "run into Freeman v. Conover."'12
Because the case of the Five Doomed Women was settled out of court, that
court did not reach the statute of limitations question. In 1935, a federal district
court in New Jersey did reach the issue and decisively ruled against a dial
painter's claim. In May 1932 Vincent LaPorte had sued USRC, seeking
damages for his wife's injuries and death from radiation poisoning. When
USRC claimed that the statute of limitations had expired, LaPorte's attorneys
began a suit in equity court to "enjoin the defendant from setting up the statute
of limitations as a defense to the plaintiff's action at law.'12
Irene LaPorte worked for USRC from May 1917 to December 1918 and for
a brief period in 1920. She remained in good health until the autumn of 1927.
That year, Irene "complained of a fear that she might have radium poisoning.
She delayed visiting her dentist for some time because other persons who had
radium poisoning had demonstrated symptoms similar to those for which she
suffered.""2 She was not diagnosed as "a victim of radium necrosis" until
October 15, 1930. She died on June 16, 1931. Martland performed an autopsy
and determined that she had died of "occupational radium poisoning.' '124
The lawsuit was filed outside the two-year limit imposed by the statute of
limitations. The court noted "if the action arose on the last day of her
employment, the statute would have normally barred her remedy some time in
1922, which is at least two years before radium necrosis was discovered and
over seven years before she was diagnosed." To avoid the effect of the statute
of limitations, Vincent LaPorte had to prove fraudulent concealment. LaPorte
had to show "some sort of conduct or acts which are fraudulent or
unconscionable.' 25 The court noted that the "important factual question" was
determining "how much the scientific and medical world and the defendant
knew about the industry" at the time Irene was exposed to radioactive
substances. 26 After surveying the scientific and medical literature, the court
concluded that "there was neither knowledge of an occupational hazard in the
dial-painting industry, nor, in the light of the knowledge concerning radium,
reason for the defendant to believe or to have known of the hazard." The same
lack of knowledge that made it difficult for victims to name their malady and
120. LaPorte, 13 F. Supp. at 272.
121. Letter from Raymond Berry to Leslie Ferguson, (May 23, 1928), RBP, reel 3.
122. LaPorte, 13 F. Supp. at 263-65.
123. Id. at 265.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 275.
126. Id. at 266.
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blame the responsible party also undermined the dial painters' attempt to
overcome absolute rules of law that were often inappropriate for occupational
diseases.
The court also questioned LaPorte's diligence in bringing the lawsuit.
"While Martland did not diagnose her case until October 15, 1930, and her
physician and dentist assured her that she did not suffer from the radium
affliction, she knew of her own experience that she was suffering .... "127 The
trial judge, somewhat troubled by his decision, confessed "there is no question
as to where the sympathies of any human being would lie in a case of this sort."
But the judge stated he had "no power to adjust the law."'
The issue decided in LaPorte was not whether a cause of action existed for
radiation poisoning but whether that cause of action was subject to the
restrictions of an ordinary statute of limitations. USRC, though, also had
claimed that no cause of action existed. A remedy under the workers'
compensation law was not available because of the restricted schedule that did
not specify radiation poisoning as a compensable injury. In their initial answer
to the dial painters' pleading, USRC attorneys argued that the workers'
compensation statute had created an exclusive remedy for injured workers.
Their argument was based on the theory that the workers' compensation system
was the sole means of reimbursing injured workers. If a worker did not qualify
under the statute, then she could not assert a cause of action under the common
law.
129
This argument was not reached in any radium dial case but was rejected in
other occupational disease lawsuits in New Jersey. In Szalkowski v. C.S.
Osborne & Co., an employer argued that the -legislature had intended to
compensate only the accidents and occupational diseases described in the statute,
to exclude all other occupational diseases as not being compensable under the
act, and to preclude a person from instituting a common-law action for an
occupational disease not scheduled in the compensation act. 3 The Szalkowski
court held that if the legislature had "intended to bar an action at common law
for an occupational disease contracted through the negligence of an employer,
the legislature would have said so."'' Another New Jersey appellate court also
rejected the "no remedy" argument in 1933, holding "it is not to be presumed
that the legislature intended to deprive the injured workman of his common-law
remedy" for an unscheduled occupational disease.3 2
127. Id. at 276.
128. Id. at 277.
129. Defendant's Original Answer, supra note 18.
130. Szalkowski v. C.S. Osborne & Co., 154 A. 611 (N.J. Cir. Ct. 1931).
131. Id. at 612.
132. Downing v. Oxweld Acetylene Co., 169 A. 709, 712 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1933).
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Employers in some states, however, were able to argue successfully that
their injured employees had neither a claim under the workers' compensation
statute nor a common-law remedy. 33 The courts in these states held that
workers' compensation was an exclusive remedy even where "it left workers
with an occupational disease, or certain occupational diseases, without a
remedy."' 3
4
The common-law action for occupational diseases usually was based on the
employer's duty to provide a safe place to work or the employer's failure to warn
the worker of dangerous conditions. 35 New Jersey recognized a common-law
action for occupational diseases as early as 1903. In Meany v. Standard Oil, an
employee, who had been injured by inhaling noxious gases, successfully asserted
that the employer had not exercised reasonable care in disposing of an "acid
gas."$136 By 1936, aNew Jersey court could state that "it is accepted law in this
state that under a contract of employment it becomes the master's duty to take
reasonable care to provide a proper and safe workplace in which the servant may
work .... ." The existence of a theoretical duty did not ensure success. In
Cichocki v. Geigy Company, the appellate court in a silicosis case reversed a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff because "to hold the existence of dust is prima
facie evidence of negligence would violate the rights of operators and also the
presumption against negligence."1 37
It is difficult to generalize on the success of common-law occupational
disease suits in the 1920s and 1930s. Common-law suits based on silicosis
exposure met with some success in New York in the early 1930s. David Rosner
and Gerald Markowitz suggest that "as workers won their suits, it emboldened
more of the unemployed and their lawyers.... In the face of obvious suffering,
judges, furthermore, were more and more likely to hold companies accountable
for death and disability resulting from known risks."'3 This success led industry
in New York to push for including silicosis under the state's compensation
scheme. John B. Andrews pointed out that "employers who had opposed
133. See Annotation, Workmen's Compensation Act as Exclusive of remedy by
action against employerfor injury or disease not compensable under act, 100 A.L.R. 519
(1936).
134. Bale, supra note 1, at 602.
135. Annotation, Duty of Master to warn servant against occupational disease, 6
A.L.R. 355 (1920); Annotation, Liability of employer at common lmv, or apart from
workmen's compensation or specific occupational disease statutes, for occupational
disease contracted by employee, 105 A.L.R. 80 (1936); Francis Bohlen, The Common
Law Right ofActionfir Occupational Disease in Pennsylvania, 63 U. PA. L. REV. 183
(1914).
136. Meany v. Standard Oil Co., 55 A. 653 (N.J. 1903) (per curiam).
137. Cichocki v. Geigy Co., 183 A. 463, 466-67 (N.J. Cir. Ct. 1936).
138. DAVID ROSNER &GERALD MARKOWITz, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE
POLITICS OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 81 (1991).
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inclusion of silicosis under the Workmen's Compensation Act came running to
the State pleading for the inclusion of silicosis under the Workmen's
Compensation Act so that they would be protected against the unlimited and
terrifying common law suits which were being filed against them."' 39 Rosner
and Markowitz conclude that, after the state compensation act was amended to
include silicosis, "compensation became so difficult to obtain and so limited that
few workers found any redress through the system." 140
V. THE DIAL WORKERS IN THE COURTS
The dial painters faced more than unwieldy legal doctrine. After the county
medical examiner's diagnosis furnished Katherine Schaub "perfect legal
evidence for a lawsuit," it was "more than a year later, after many
disappointments, that a firm of lawyers agreed to take the case. 4 ' Other workers
had similar problems in obtaining representation. Lawyers, according to
Katherine Schaub, rejected her case "because of the length of time between my
employment at the factory and the beginning of my illness."' 42
The statute of limitations, however, was only one of several obstacles facing
the workers. These impediments provided powerful economic disincentives
against lawyers handling these claims on a contingent-fee basis. The rationale
for contingent fees is to provide access to courts for those who do not have the
resources to pay directly for legal services. 43 But typically lawyers only take
cases on a contingency-fee basis where there is a high expectation of recovery. 144
Therefore, victims with legitimate claims often go without counsel if their case
is doomed or even complicated by the facts or legal principles involved. As
Owen Fiss has explained, "[t]he contingent fee does not equalize resources; it
only makes an indigent plaintiff vulnerable to the willingness of the private bar
to invest" in her case. 145 Most lawyers were unwilling to "invest" in the dial
painters' cases.
After Berry filed the lawsuit on behalf of the Five Doomed Women, USRC
delayed the proceedings to gain a tactical advantage. For example, the hearing
in the New Jersey Chancery Court began on January 12, 1928, was adjourned
to April 6, 1928, and was rescheduled for September 24, 1928.146 According to
139. Id. at 91.
140. Id. at 81.
141. Schaub, supra note 36,passim.
142. Schaub, supra note 36, passim.
143. See, e.g., Barry J. Nace, The Contingent Fee: Breathing Life into America's
Justice System, 30 TRIAL, Oct. 1994, at 59.
144. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1077 (1984).
145. Id.
146. Schaub, supra note 36, at 139-40.
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Schaub, the defense lawyers at the April 1928 hearing argued that "one of their
important witnesses was obliged to leave town, making it impossible to complete
the case at that time." Following this delay, the next open date on the court's
calendar was five months later. 47
These delaying tactics played a central role in Berry's decision to settle the
claims of the Five Doomed Women. Berry explained to Alice Hamilton that he
felt compelled to settle the claims because his clients were suffering and could
not afford a further delay.
It seemed better to accept a small sum at once, rather than to continue a
protracted litigation, the outcome of which was rather doubtful because of the
technicalities. I refer, of course, to the situation so far as the statute of
limitations is concerned. Legally, the point is a very close one, and although
I believe that we would finally win out, it would not be until after one and
possibly two appeals had been taken to the Court of Errors and Appeals,
which would carry the cases on for at least two years yet .... 1 41
The corporation and its lawyers pursued a strategy of delay that is
commonly used by defendants in personal injury suits. Defendants ordinarily
gain a variety of tactical advantages from exploiting the "chronic overload" that
characterizes the legal process.'49 Delay is endemic to an overloaded court
calendar, and exploitive, obstructionist defense strategies compound the already
long wait for trial. This delay can also "discount" the value of recovery.Y0
Owen Fiss notes that a plaintiff may immediately need the damages that she
seeks and can often be induced to settle as a way of accelerating payment, even
though she realizes that a damage award received at trial may be significantly
larger.'5' Because an indigent plaintiff's need is so great, defendants can force
her to accept a sum that is significantly less than the ordinary present value of the
judgment. 2 Berry explained that he felt compelled to settle the Canfield case
because the family was "poverty stricken" and Mrs. Canfield was pregnant.'53
Tactical delays also increase the cost of litigation for the plaintiffs attorney. In
contingency fee arrangements, the plaintiff s lawyer may recommend settlement
because that lawyer no longer wants to invest any more time and money in the
lawsuit.
147. Schaub, supra note 36, at 140.
148. Letter from Raymond Berry to Alice Hamilton (June 6, 1928), RBP, reel 3.
149. Galanter, supra note 4, at 121.
150. Galanter, supra note 4, at 121.
151. Fiss, supra note 144, at 1076.
152. Note, Settling For Less: Applying Law and Economics to Poor People, 107
HARV. L. REv. 442, 449 (1993).
153. Letter from Raymond Berry to Alice Hamilton (April 2, 1930), RBP, reel 1.
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Delays typically work to the advantage of defendants in personal injury
suits in other ways. Since plaintiffs bear the burden of proof, they are frequently
hurt more by the disappearance of witnesses and the fading of memories during
the long wait for trial. Discouraged attorneys, and even plaintiffs themselves,
often forsake cases that languish on courts' dockets. Plaintiffs occasionally die
waiting for their day in court. This too can benefit defendants. Jury damage
awards for wrongful death suits are often lower than damage awards for severely
injured plaintiffs. Because the family of the deceased will receive compensation
instead of the victim, sympathy is not as great a factor. The deceased victim
cannot display his or her injuries to a jury and cannot testify against the
defendant.
All these factors were present in the dial-painter episode. The Five
Doomed Women were expected to die and perhaps would not testify at their own
trial. Their testimony was important both to demonstrate the severity of their
conditions and to offer specific evidence of working conditions and practices
within the plant. Berry had also hoped to use the testimony of Dr. Sabin Von
Sochocky, a scientist and one-time executive of USRC. Von Sochocky, himself
dying of radiation poisoning, had admitted that he knew the women were being
injured while they were still working in the plant. He had tried to remedy the
dangerous conditions but was thwarted by other members of the corporation. 54
Von Sochocky's revelations, if confirmed, would have been tremendously
damaging to the defense, but the scientist died of radiation poisoning in 1928.
Berry later explained that he settled the Canfield case in 1930, in part, because
the death of Von Sochocky denied him an important witness. 55 Ultimately,
cases where women died before a settlement generated lower settlement awards
than those cases in which the victim survived until the litigation or settlement
was concluded. In 1926, for example, an attorney settled three early dial-painter
cases for $9,000, $3,000, and $1,000. The woman still living received the
highest settlement; the families of two deceased workers received the smaller
awards.5 6 Delay then, before and after a lawsuit was filed, may have
significantly benefitted USRC.
Ironically, USRC's manipulation of the court's calendar may have
necessitated, or at least accelerated, its ultimate settlement with the Five Doomed
Women. An editorial in Outlook observed that "the crowded condition of the
court calendar and the obstructionist policy of the Radium Corporation made it
seem improbable that any settlement they could obtain might be a post-mortem
one."'57  Similarly, in May 1928, the New York World declared that the
postponement of the trial was "one of the most damnable travesties ofjustice that
154. Letter from Raymond Berry to Fredrick Hoffman (Jan. 3, 1928), RBP, reel 3.
155. Letter from Raymond Berry to Alice Hamilton, supra note 153.
156. Bale, supra note 1, at 640.
157. Justice Outspeeds the Law, 149 OUTLOOK, June 20, 1928, at 290-91.
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has ever come to our attention" and concluded that "[i]f ever a case called for
prompt adjudication it is the case of the five crippled women who are fighting
for a few miserable dollars to ease their 'last days on earth."'" 58 Schaub later
wrote that "what had once been a hopeless case, unheeded and unnoticed, now
flashed before the public. Everywhere people were asking why justice was
being denied these five women, who, the doctors said, had but a year to live."' 59
As publicity grew, USRC agreed to a settlement that it might have
otherwise avoided. On June 11, 1928 the Radium Corporation agreed to pay
Fryer, Schaub, Larice, McDonald and Hussman $10,000 each as $600 each year
in quarterly payments, legal costs totalling $4,500, and past medical expenses
not exceeding $7,500 for all five plaintiffs. Berry and his legal team received
$15,000.1' While USRC settled with the five claimants in the wake of intense
negative publicity, the editorialists and outraged public did not realize that the
settlement of the cases also could be turned to the tactical advantage of the
defendants.
A variety of factors prompted the final settlement agreement. First, the
delay in the case had begun to work against the corporation's long-term interests.
USRC settled because it feared its business would suffer from adverse publicity
and because of the growing danger of an unknown number of future suits.
Second, the case had an "educative" effect.'6 ' The more the case was in the
news, the more likely it became that other affected workers would consider
bringing cases against the company. Indeed, after the Five Doomed Women
became front-page news, more claims and suits surfaced. Third, the settlement
allowed USRC to neutralize the most visible and dangerous claimants and wait
for a better case to press to adjudication. Consequently, even though USRC's
manipulative delay did not unfold as it had anticipated, it accomplished several
of the defendant's goals and allowed it to employ other tactics to undercut the
threat of widespread liability.
Although Berry gained substantial cash settlements for his clients, he
recognized that the settlements represented "a strategic move on the part of the
defense."" USRC wanted to choose its day in court. Berry predicted that "in
the future an attempt will be made to clear the question of radium dangers
forever."'" In a letter to the chief medical examiner of New York City, Berry
158. Quoted in New Jersey Radium Cases-The Lesson, 18 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REv.
388 (1928).
159. Schaub, supra note 36, at 140.
160. Settlement Stipulation, June 11, 1928, PNCL, reel 86.
161. On the "educative" effect of litigation, see Marc Galanter, Case Congregations
and their Careers, 24 L. & Soc'Y REV. 371, 383-84 (1990).
162. Bale, supra note 1, at 644.




DeVille and Steiner: Deville: New Jersey Radium Dial Workers
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
wrote that the settlement "is a bargain in which the corporation is making a
present payment of cash in order to, if possible, work itself into a better position
in the future."'"5 He admitted that "the corporation gets a great advantage by the
settlement agreement" and lamented to Alice Hamilton that he was not satisfied
with the settlement because the "obvious intention of the Corporation is to clear
itself in the future."''
Of course, Berry was correct. The company waited for a suit by Vincent
LaPorte on behalf of his late wife Irene to press for a decision on the statute of
limitation issue. The federal district court held that the statute of limitations
barred any dial-painter suit against the company that had not been filed within
two years of the last day of employment. 67 USRC was represented by the firms
of Collins and Corbin, and Edwards, Smith, and Dawson-the New Jersey firms
that had represented the company in all its previous claims.
The company's defensive tactics and strategy fall within the pattern
outlined by Marc Galanter in his seminal article "Why the 'Haves' Come Out
Ahead."' Galanter explains how the differences between parties involved in the
legal process affect the way the system works. 69 Galanter divides parties into
two groups: one-shotters, "who have only occasional recourse to the courts;"
and repeat players, "who are engaged in many similar litigations."'70 Repeat
players, like USRC, play the "litigation game" differently than one-shotters.
Repeat players, who will face many future lawsuits, are guided by different
motivations and incentives. Their long-term perspective also gives them a
variety of tactical advantages. Repeat players "can adopt strategies calculated
to maximize gain over a long series of cases even where this involves the risk of
maximum loss in some cases." USRC, for example, paid relatively large sums
of money to the Five Doomed Women, but ultimately protected themselves from
the majority of potential claimants in New Jersey.
Galanter speculated that repeat players' different litigation behavior would
affect the development of legal rules.
We would then expect RPs to "settle" cases where they expect unfavorable
rule outcomes. Since they expect to litigate again, RPs can select to
adjudicate (or appeal) those cases which they regard as most likely to produce
favorable rules. On the other hand, OSs should be willing to trade off the
possibility of making "good law" for tangible gain. Thus, we would expect
the body of "precedent" cases-that is, cases capable of influencing the
165. Letter from Raymond Berry to Chas. Norris (June 6, 1928), RBP, reel 3.
166. Letter from Raymond Berry to Alice Hamilton (June 6, 1928), RBP, reel 3.
167. LaPorte v. United States Radium Corp., 13 F. Supp. 263, 277 (D.N.J. 1935).
168. Galanter, supra note 4, at 97.
169. Galanter, supra note 4, at 97.
170. Galanter, supra note 4, at 97-114.
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outcome of future cases-to be relatively skewed toward those favorable to
RPs.171
In the litigation process, then, repeat players are in a "position of advantage in
the configuration of contending parties.' 72
The topology of repeat players and one-shotters explains the early
settlements by USRC and its later intransigence. The company and its lawyers
faced future lawsuits and they structured their litigation strategy accordingly.
They chose to settle with Berry's clients because they feared his chances of
success and the insight publicity gave to potential litigants. The corporation's
attorneys pushed LaPorte to an adjudication because they correctly regarded it
as the case most likely to produce a favorable result. After the trial court's
published opinion in LaPorte, no record exists of the company settling any New
Jersey claims.
USRC also had retained the same lawyers for every occupational disease
claim against the company.'73 These firms gained experience and skill in
handling the highly complex and technical cases. This experience and
specialization was offset somewhat by Berry's growing experience and
knowledge about radiation poisoning cases. Berry was involved in dial-painter
litigation for nearly five years and had accumulated valuable scientific resources
and legal research. This knowledge was unique: a new attorney for the dial
painters would have been forced to start his research from the beginning and face
an experienced defense team. Berry's files, in fact, contain many requests from
other attorneys contemplating action against the company asking legal advice.7
After the settlement of the case of the Five Doomed Women in 1928, Berry was
ready to bring more claims against the company. In 1930 USRC transferred two
dial-painter lawsuits from state to federal court because it feared that all the suits
would be consolidated under Berry's representation.7 7 Berry represented a
dangerous and durable adversary who could have plagued USRC for years.
Berry, however, never fully used his storehouse of experience and
knowledge. USRC attorneys were able to "cash ouf' Berry. When Berry settled
Mae Cubberly Canfield's claim in 1930, the settlement was conditioned upon his
agreement to accept no future radiation poisoning suits. Mrs. Canfield received
$3,500, her husband $1,000, and Berry $4,000. The settlement included a
stipulation by Berry "not to be connected with, directly or indirectly, any other
cases against the United States Radium Corporation, nor to render assistance to
171. Galanter, supra note 4, at 101-02.
172. Galanter, supra note 4, at 103.
173. See Galanter, supra note 4, at 114-16.
174. See, e.g., Letter from Chas Week to Raymond Berry (April 30, 1930), RBP,
reel 1.
175. Letter from Raymond Berry to Florence Kelly (Jan. 18, 1929), PNCL, reel 86.
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any person or persons in any actions against said Company, or to furnish data or
information to any such persons in matters against said Company.' 1 76 Berry
honored his agreement and routinely refused requests from attorneys seeking his
advice-aid that he regularly supplied before the settlement. Berry informed one
lawyer who sought his help: "I will not be able to help you .... As I told you
on the phone, I am not going to take part in any more radium litigation and will,
accordingly, not be able to be of assistance .... 17 Katherine Wiley of the
Consumer's League confirmed that Berry's departure severely crippled the
campaign against USRC. As she later lamented, "Mr. B[erry] had all the data
& experience[.] Other lawyers tried it [suing USRC], [they] came to me but they
were not successful.'1
78
USRC's defense team did not invent this tactic. Although these secret
agreements were not part of the court record, they apparently were common.
The Houston law firm of Baker and Botts used such settlements to discourage
lawsuits against their railroad corporation clients in turn-of-the-century Texas. 17 9
In two contemporaneous occupational disease cases, plaintiffs' attorneys also
were "cashed out" with settlement agreements. In 1933, the attorney
representing eleven asbestosis plaintiffs in lawsuits against Johns Manville
Corporation settled all eleven claims and agreed that "he would neither directly
or indirectly participate in the bringing of any new lawsuits against the
company."' 0 Ten years passed before another asbestos exposure suit was
brought against the company.'' Similarly, when seventeen plaintiffs' lawyers
involved in the Gauley Bridge disaster settled the claims of 157 plaintiffs for
$130,000 in 1933, they secretly agreed not to engaged in further legal action for
another $20,000."' In the 1970s, defense attorneys in the Buffalo Creek mining
disaster informed the plaintiffs' attorney that the multi-million dollar settlement
"would have to include an agreement.., not to represent any other plaintiffs
... against the coal company."'8  The plaintiffs' attorney later commented that
176. Letter from Raymond Berry to Edwards & Smith (March 8, 1930), RBP,
reel 1. On "buying out" legal resources of a class of claimants, see Galanter, supra note
161, at 383-84.
177. Letter from Arthur Karl to Raymond Berry (March 26, 1930); Letter from
Raymond Berry to Arthur Karl (no date), RBP, reel 1.
178. Letter from Katherine Wiley to Josephine Goldmark (Dec. 13, 1948), PNCL,
reel 86.
179. KENNETH LiPARTrro & JOSEPH PRATT, BAKER & Burrs IN TiE DEVELOPMENT
OF MODERN HOUSTON 28 (1991).
180. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON
TRIAL 114, 164 (1985).
181. Id. at 164.
182. MARTIN CHERNIACK, THE HAwK'S NEST INCIDENT: AMERICA'S WORST
INDUSTRIAL DISASTER 65 (1986).
183. GERALD STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER 298-99 (1976).
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such agreements were "fairly standard practice."'84 Recent legal texts confirm
that "cashing out" talented and well-informed plaintiffs' attorneys remains an
important defensive tactic. 8 ' The ploy maintains the repeat-player advantage
enjoyed by corporate defendants, while effectively denying plaintiffs the services
of the most effective attorney for their case.
VI. CONCLUSION
Only a few dial painters were able to overcome the factors that discouraged
the use of the legal system as a remedy for their injuries, even fewer secured
compensation for their illnesses. Their problems, however, cannot be explained
solely by the seemingly heartless public position and legal maneuvers of their
employer. The very nature of the victims' illnesses hampered clear identification
of the problem and slowed formal legal involvement. The corporation defense
team, though, was able to exploit the initial confusion caused by the medical
aspects of the case so that the women's maladies were only gradually perceived
as occupational injuries and belatedly characterized into articulatable grievances
and concrete legal action. When a few women did resort to the legal system for
relief, they faced hurdles endemic to the legal process and a dynamic of litigation
that typically favors and rewards repeat-player defendants.'86
Workplace exposures to toxic substances and injurious practices continue
to generate heretofore unknown occupational diseases and have vexed the legal
system through the twentieth century. 87 According to one source, occupational
exposure to toxic materials is currently responsible for causing 50,000-70,000
new illnesses annually.' Clearly, not all occupational illnesses are attributable
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to negligent conduct, but at least some are the result of improper handling of
toxic substances, insufficient safety controls or standards, or inadequate testing
of work-related, potentially toxic materials. As did the radium dial painters, the
casualties of these previously unknown occupational diseases face substantial
and complex obstacles at each stage of the naming, blaming, and claiming
process. In part as a consequence, as little as three percent of incidents of
occupational disease lead to workers' compensation claims, 9 and as few as one-
thirteenth of disabling injuries of occupational origin received any
compensation. 90 Despite formal reforms in legal doctrine and procedure,
scientific advancements, and innovations in litigation strategy, 9' the same forces
that shaped the dial-painter episode continue to surface in other occupational
health injuries and illnesses and help explain why the legal system sometimes
appears inherently handicapped in its treatment of previously unrecognized
occupational disease and mass tort injuries.
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